Cached data not only replies local access, but also replies data request issued from other nodes.
Introduction
Wireless networks are built upon a shared medium that makes it easy for adversaries to launch jamming-style attacks. These attacks can be easily accomplished by an adversary emitting radio frequency signals that do not follow an underlying MAC protocol. Jamming attacks can severely interfere with the normal operation of wireless networks and, consequently, mechanisms are needed that can cope with jamming attacks. As these networks gain popularity, providing security and trustworthiness will become an issue of critical importance. Many wireless security threats may be addressed through appropriately designed network security architectures which are essentially modifications of traditional security services, such as confidentiality, authentication, and integrity to the wireless domain. Wireless networks, however, are susceptible to threats that are not able to be adequately addressed via cryptographic methods. One serious class of such threats are attacks of radio interference. This exposes them to passive and active attacks, which are different in their nature and objectives. In the former, a malicious entity does not take any action except passively observing ongoing communication, e.g. eavesdropping so as to intervene with the privacy of network entities involved in the transaction. On the other hand, an active attacker is involved in transmission as well. Depending on attacker objectives, different terminology is used. If the attacker abuses a protocol with the goal to obtain performance benefit itself, the attack is referred to as misbehavior. If the attacker does not directly manipulate protocol parameters but exploits protocol semantics and aims at indirect benefit by unconditionally disrupting network operation, the attack is termed jamming or Denial-of-Service (DoS), depending on whether one looks at its cause or its consequences.
Jamming can disrupt wireless transmission and can occur either unintentionally in the form of interference, noise or collision at the receiver side or in the context of an attack. A jamming attack is particularly effective since (i) no special hardware is needed in order to be launched, (ii) it can be implemented by simply listening to the open medium and broadcasting in the same frequency band as the network and (iii) if launched wisely, it can lead to significant benefit with small incurred cost for the attacker For an adversary agnostic to the implementation details of the network, a typical jamming strategy is the continuous emission of high-power interference signals such as continuous wave tones, or FM modulated noise. However, adopting an "always-on" jamming strategy has several disadvantages. First, the adversary has to expend a significant amount of energy to jam frequency bands of interest. Second, the continuous presence of high interference levels makes this type of jamming easy to detect. Third, these attacks are easy to mitigate either by spread spectrum communications, spatial retreats, or localization and removal of the jamming nodes.
II.

Background Work And Literature Survey
Intelligent attacks which target the transmission of specific packets were presented. Thuente considered an attacker who infers eminent packet transmissions based on timing information at the MAC layer Channelselective jamming attacks were considered. It was shown that targeting the control channel reduces the required power for performing a DoS attack by several orders of magnitude. To protect control channel traffic, control information was replicated in multiple channels. The "locations" of the channels where control traffic was broadcasted at any given time, was cryptographically protected. We proposed a randomized frequency hopping algorithm, to protect the control channel inside jammers. The jammer controls probability of jamming and transmission range in order to cause maximal damage to the network in terms of corrupted communication links. The jammer action ceases when it is detected by the network, namely by a monitoring node, and a notification message is transferred out of the jamming region. The fundamental tradeoff faced by the attacker is the following: a more aggressive attack in terms of higher jamming probability or larger transmission range increases the instantaneously derived payoff but exposes the attacker to the network and facilitates its detection and later on its isolation. In an effort to withstand the attack and alleviate the attacker benefit, the network adapts channel access probability. In Strong Hiding Commitment Scheme we use DES algorithm to encrypt packets where single secret key is used between sender and receiver. The major disadvantage is, the attacker can easily retrieve the packets based on brute force attacks so we need to provide more security for the packets. In Cryptographic puzzle Hiding Scheme, where each packet is attached with the puzzle and encrypted. We specify the time limit for the solution of the puzzle. If puzzle is not solved within the time limit there may be dropping of packets and also there is a delay in receiving the packets. Selective jamming attacks have been experimentally implemented using software defined radio engines. USRP2-based jamming platform called RF React was implemented by Wilhelm that enables selective and reactive jamming. We develop three schemes that prevent jamming attacks; they are Strong Hiding Commitment Scheme, Cryptographic Puzzle Hiding Scheme and All or Nothing Transformation
III. Problem Statement And Model Assumptions
Consider the scenario depicted in Figure 1(a) . Nodes A and B communicate over the wireless medium and a jamming node J is within communication range of both A and B. Node A transmits a packet m to B which is eavesdropped by node J. Node J is able to classify m by receiving only its first few bytes. J then corrupts m by interfering with its reception at B. We address the problems of (a) evaluating the ability of the adversary in classifying transmitted messages in real-time, and (b) developing resource-efficient mechanisms for preventing real-time packet classification.
Network model-Our network consists of a collection of nodes connected via wireless links. Nodes may communicate directly, or over multiple hops. The nodes of the network can establish globally shared keys, either by manual preload, or via an online key distribution center. Communication Model-Communication can be either broadcast or unicast. Packets are transmitted at a rate of R bauds. Each symbol corresponds to q bits according to the underlying digital modulation scheme. Here the transmission bit rate is equal to qR bps. To generalize our analysis, we do not consider any spreading of the data. However, our results hold even if data is spread to a wider spectrum according to any technique such as DSSS or FHSS. Transmitted packets have the generic frame format depicted in Figure 1(b) . The preamble is used for synchronizing the sampling process at the receiver. The PHY header contains information regarding the length of the frame and the transmission rate. The MAC header contains information relevant to the MAC layer. In particular, the MAC header determines the MAC protocol version, the type of packet (management, control, or data) and its subtype (e.g. association request/response, RTS, CTS, ACK, etc.), the source and destination addresses plus some additional fields regarding power management, security parameters, and information for future transmissions. The MAC header is followed by the frame body that contains higher layer information. Finally, the MAC frame is protected by a CRC code attached in the CRC field. Adversary Model-We assume the adversary is in control of the communication medium and can jam messages at any part of the network of his choosing. The adversary can operate in full-duplex mode, thus being able to receive and transmit concurrently. This can be achieved, for example, with the use of multiple radios. In addition, the adversary is equipped with directional antennas that enable the reception of a signal from one node and jamming of the same signal at another. The adversary is assumed to be computationally bounded, although he can be significantly more powerful than the network devices. Solving well-known hard cryptographic problems is assumed to be time-consuming. The network employs a monitoring mechanism for detecting potential malicious activity by a jammer. The monitoring mechanism consists of the following: (i) determination of a subset of nodes M that will act as network monitors, and (ii) Employment of a detection algorithm at each monitor node. The assignment of the role of monitor to a node can be affected by energy limitations and detection performance specifications. In this work, we fix M and formulate optimization problems for one or more monitor nodes. We now fix attention to detection at one monitor node. First, we define the quantity to be observed at each monitor node. In Our case, the readily available metric is probability of collision that a monitor node experiences, namely the percentage of packets that are erroneously received. During normal network operation, and in the absence of a jammer, we consider a large enough training period in which the monitor node "learns" the percentage of collisions it experiences as the long-term average of the ratio of number of slots in which there was a collision over total number of slots of the training period. Assume now the network operates in the open after the training period and fix attention to a time window much smaller than the training period. An increased percentage of collisions over this time window compared to the learned long-term average may be an indication of an ongoing jamming attack or only a temporary increase of percentage of collisions compared to the average during normal network operation.
IV. Conclusion
We illustrated the effectiveness of selective jamming attacks by implementing such attacks against the TCP protocol. We showed that an adversary can exploit its knowledge of the protocol implementation to increase the impact of his attack at a significantly lower energy cost. We illustrated the feasibility of selective jamming attacks by performing real time packet classification. Therefore, to improve detection, we introduced the notion of consistency checking, where the packet delivery ratio is used to classify a radio link as having poor utility, and then a consistency check is performed to classify whether poor link quality is due to jamming. There exist several directions for future study. Interesting issues arise in multi-channel networks. In that case, the defense strategy space has an additional dimension, channel switching, while the jammer has higher energy costs when jamming more channels. Another interesting issue is to find alternatives for modeling lack of knowledge for the attacker and the network. An idea would be to average over all strategies of the opponent.
